![]() 1 China’s political elite is – rightly – convinced that the United States is seeking at the very least to prevent any further expansion of Chinese influence. And in its London Declaration of December 2019 NATO spoke for the first time of the challenges (and opportunities) presented by China’s influence and international policies. Since 2017 China has been treated as a “long-term strategic competitor” in official US government strategy documents. ![]() The pandemic may also witness some nations gaining soft power by showing solidarity, while others lose some of theirs for not doing so. This is already seen in the ideological realm where China, after first being criticised for the way it handled the virus outbreak, now highlights the advantages of its own – authoritarian – governance system in responding to such crises. In some areas, the pandemic may actually fuel the competition. But even with heightened co-operation in some policy fields, the rivalry between the United States and China will likely remain a – if not the – defining issue in international relations for some time to come. This cannot happen without the buy-in of most, if not all, the major powers. It is possible – but by no means certain – that the aftermath of the crisis may actually see global governance structures strengthened in individual policy realms, particularly with regard to global health. Like any global crisis, the pandemic will leave an impact on patterns of international governance and cooperation, and probably on the structures of the international system. At least for the United States, it can be said that strategic rivalry with China has edged out the “War on Terror” paradigm that had prevailed since 2001.Īll contributions to this publication were written before the Corona crisis began. But the rivalry does increasingly frequently form the lens through which other actors view important developments and events. That is not to say that the competition between Washington and Beijing, or even great power rivalry in general, determine all other international problems and conflicts. It shapes strategic debates and real political, military and economic dynamics, and is likely to continue to do so for some time. Rivalry between the United States and China has become a paradigm of international relations over the past two years. Volker Perthes Dimensions of Strategic Rivalry: China, the United States and Europe’s Place That requires a “supranational geopolitics”. The European Union must develop a China policy for its drive towards sovereignty (strategic autonomy). ■ Europe needs to escape the bipolar logic that demands it choose between the American and Chinese economic/technological spheres. While Washington has withdrawn from a number of multilateral institutions, Beijing is expanding its influence in contexts like the United Nations. ■ The Sino-American rivalry also undermines multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organisation. ■ Through their respective leadership styles, Presidents Trump and Xi foment bilateral conflicts and – each in their own way – damage international rules and institutions. The development and use of technologies thus become part of a systemic competition. ■ The crux of the technological dimension is not who sets the standards, but geopolitical power projection through “technopolitical spheres of influence”. ![]() ■ The US-China trade conflict is politically instrumental and closely bound up with the development of the world order. ![]() ■ The dimensions of Sino-American competition over power and status include growing threat perceptions and an increasingly important political/ ideological component. It shapes both strategic debates and real political, military and economic dynamics. ■ Rivalry between the United States and China has become a paradigm of international relations over the past two years.
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